



WHEN PLAY BECOMES WORK: 
CHILD LABOR LAWS IN THE ERA OF “KIDFLUENCERS” 
MARINA A. MASTERSON† 
In the past few years, “kidfluencers,” or children with large social media 
followings, have been integral to the rise of an $8-billion social media advertising 
industry. The most successful kidfluencers make up to $26 million in a year by posting 
sponsored content and monetizing ad space on their social media pages. Because 
kidfluencers have no legal right to these earnings or safe working conditions, the risk 
of exploitation is extreme and immediate. Still, the issue is nuanced because parents 
significantly control the production of their children’s online content, and states are 
limited in how much they may regulate a parent’s decisions in raising their child. 
This Comment addresses how kidfluencers fit in the child labor regime, specifically 
by comparing child actor law. Child actors are not covered by federal statutory labor 
laws, resulting in a patchwork of state regulations. This Comment proposes that states 
should enact laws, akin to child actor Coogan Laws, to financially protect 
kidfluencers. However, it concedes that certain common child actor regulations, like 
those involving work permits and workplace conditions, are difficult, if not impossible, 
to impose on kidfluencers. Ultimately, current child actor laws should not simply be 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, viewers regularly tuned in to watch the seven Hobson children 
play and laugh on their YouTube channel, Fantastic Adventures.1 The channel 
had more than 700,800 followers and more than 242 million views.2 Not only 
did the viewers benefit from this free entertainment, but Machelle Hobson, 
the channel’s producer and mother of the children, made nearly $300,000 from 
the series.3 
But if viewers could look through their screens and glimpse the real lives 
of these young YouTube stars, they would find that five of the seven Hobson 
children had not attended school in years, according to police records.4 Their 
mother reportedly took them out so they could focus on the YouTube series.5 
The children said that if they forgot their lines or were difficult during 
 
1 The YouTube channel has since been deleted. 
2 Julia Carrie Wong, ‘It’s Not Play if You’re Making Money’: How Instagram and YouTube Disrupted Child 




4 YouTube Mom Charged with 30 Counts of Child Abuse, CBS NEWS (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:40 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/machelle-hobson-charged-youtube-mom-behind-fantastic-
adventures-channel-indicted-30-counts-child-abuse [https://perma.cc/U5N6-KPG5] [hereinafter 
YouTube Mom Charged]; Wong, supra note 2 (quoting Pinal Cnty. Sup. Ct., 190313035, Release 
Questionnaire: Machelle L, Logan D. Hackney, Ryan D. Hackney, https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/5776169/Reporte-De-Policia-Mujer-Arrestada.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X782-6K3Y]). 
5 YouTube Mom Charged, supra note 4. 
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production, their mother would beat, pepper-spray, molest, and starve them.6 
Hobson pleaded not guilty to charges of child abuse.7 
This tragic story reminds us that monetizing children risks 
unconscionable exploitation, even by their own parents. What’s more, the 
Hobson children had no legal right to the $300,000, even though it was earned 
through their talents and sacrifices. States have not formally recognized social 
media production as a form of labor or acting for adults or children, so these 
entertainers have no specific labor protections.8 
Children who have large social media followings, like the Hobsons, are 
colloquially called “kidfluencers.”9 Unlike traditional child acting, parents do 
not need industry connections or expensive acting classes to make their child 
a social media star; they just need an idea, a social media account, some 
filming skills, and luck. As part of a budding $8-billion industry,10 kidfluencers 
make money both from companies that pay for the children to advertise their 
products and from social media platforms that sell advertisement space on 
kidfluencers’ channels.11 Some will even post content for a company in 
exchange for free products instead of monetary compensation.12 Because 
social media has turned children into potential sources of fame and income, 
kidfluencers face many threats, including financial exploitation, psychological 
harm, and extreme loss of privacy. 
 
6 Wong, supra note 2. 
7 Jay Croft & Amanda Watts, YouTube Mom Pleads Not Guilty to Abusing Children, CNN (Mar. 
29, 2019, 1:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/29/us/youtube-mom-hobson-abuse-claims-
plea/index.html [https://perma.cc/E7UR-TZVH]. 
8 Though states do not currently provide protections to influencers, the FTC has at least 
recognized the industry in its Endorsement Guide, which says that influencers should disclose that 
their endorsements are paid advertisements. See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009). 
9 See infra notes 31–47 and accompanying text. 
10 Audrey Schomer, Influencer Marketing: State of the Social Media Influencer Market in 2020, 
BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/influencer-marketing-
report [https://perma.cc/V9ZS-HZEF]. 
11 See Sapna Maheshwari, Online and Making Thousands, at Age 4: Meet the Kidfluencers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/01/business/media/social-media-
influencers-kids.html [https://perma.cc/3VER-95BG] (reporting that some kidfluencers make up to 
$50,000 per sponsored video); Elizabeth Gravier, This Millennial Farmer Makes 5 Times More Money 
from His YouTube Channel than His Crops—Here’s How, CNBC MAKE IT (Nov. 27, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/27/how-much-money-a-social-media-influencer-makes-
farming.html [https://perma.cc/65PZ-6S88] (reporting on how one influencer makes money 
through advertisements and sponsorship deals). 
12 Sapna Maheshwari, Are You Ready for the Nanoinfluencers?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/11/business/media/nanoinfluencers-instagram-influencers.html 
[https://perma.cc/3U42-H59L] (explaining that brands will give nanoinfluencers—influencers with 
between approximately 1,000 and 5,00 followers—free products in exchange for the influencer’s 
posts about the product, rather than money). 
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In this Comment, I propose that state governments need to financially 
protect child social media influencers. Some states have enacted labor and 
family statutes to protect traditional child actors from harm, though they do 
not extend to kidfluencers. A notable way that some states protect child actors 
is through Coogan Laws.13 These laws generally mandate state-approved 
work permits and require that a certain percentage of the child actor’s 
earnings be protected in a trust account, rather than under the control of the 
parents.14 States should require Coogan trusts for high-earning social media 
influencers to protect against financial exploitation,15 though permits and 
other production regulations common for child actors are less easily applied 
in this context. 
Though simple in theory, this proposed expansion of labor law raises a 
host of uncharted policy decisions. As an illustration, California attempted to 
extend its Child Actor’s Bill to social media influencers, but the provision was 
entirely removed before the bill’s amendments passed.16 Kansen Chu, the 
California Assemblymember who introduced the so-called “kidfluencer” 
provision, pointed out the novel challenges of applying existing Coogan Laws 
to this industry, including how to regulate compensation in the form of 
“tickets and toys and clothes and other little things.”17 As a solution to this 
particular issue, this Comment proposes that Coogan requirements should 
only apply to contracts worth $500 or more because it allows the most 
commodified kidfluencers to receive immediate protection while the industry 
works out how and if to regulate other forms of compensation.18 This is just 
one example of the open issues addressed in this Comment that need further 
exploration before another bill is likely to succeed. 
While states are considering protective measures, they must bear in mind 
that child labor law inherently conflicts with family law and the constitutional 
right to parental authority, particularly in the social media context. Parents 
traditionally have the right to raise their children how they see fit,19 but that 
right is not without limits.20 Social media production is often overseen by the 
 
13 See infra notes 73–84 and accompanying text. 
14 Id. 
15 During the editing of this Comment, France became the first country to pass such a law, 
protecting the earnings of child influencers and limiting the hours they can work. France Passes New 
Law to Protect Child Influencers, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-54447491 [https://perma.cc/U5PC-2ZPV]. 
16 Assemb. B. 2388, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced). 
17 Wong, supra note 2. 
18 Infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) as the two foundational cases for the constitutional 
right to parental authority). 
20 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944) (holding that the state may impose 
restrictions on parental authority in the interest of child welfare). 
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parents within their own home, and it can look like family play, not work.21 
But at the same time, parents of kidfluencers may have perverse motivations 
when they stand to gain fame and money from exploiting this “play.”22 Thus, 
states must balance the right to family autonomy with the interest in 
protecting child performers. 
This Comment explores the history of child labor laws and its interaction 
with entertainment industries, concluding that social media influencers 
require similar, but not identical, protections to traditional child actors. There 
are new calls for regulation in this field,23 but this Comment is the first to 
take an in-depth look at the family law implications and address how 
workplace regulations, like hour limits and tutoring requirements, struggle to 
fit in this context. Protecting child earnings through Coogan trusts is a 
practicable way to financially protect kidfluencers, but regulating the content 
production itself is more difficult. Many states have permit and workplace 
requirements in studio production to address things like health and 
education,24 but these regulations are largely unworkable in the fast-paced 
 
21 For example, Ryan Kaji, the star of a YouTube channel called Ryan’s World, rose to fame 
after his parents began posting videos of him playing with new toys and reviewing them. See Amanda 
Perelli, 8-Year-Old Ryan Kaji is the World’s Top-Earning YouTube Star. His Parents Took Us Inside His 
Business, Which Had Over $200 Million in Retail Sales Last Year and Employs a 30-Person Production 
Team, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/inside-ryans-world-
business-interview-youtube-tv-toys-2020-9 [https://perma.cc/WLW4-4EJN]. He is now the 
highest-paid YouTube star in the world, earning about $20 million from YouTube and more than 
$200 million in retail sales in 2019. Id. His channel posts videos most days and, since its creation in 
2015, has posted at least 1,830 videos at the time of writing. Ryan’s World, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/c/RyanToysReview/featured[https://perma.cc/MMY3-UX5F]. 
22 See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
23 See Assemb. B. 2388, 2017-18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced by Assemb. Chu, Feb. 14, 2018) 
(demonstrating a legislative effort in California to include social media influencers under child actor laws); 
Neyza L. Guzman, The Children of YouTube: How an Entertainment Industry Goes Around Child Labor Laws, 8 
CHILD & FAM. L.J. 85, 109-10 (2020) (presenting three possibilities for reform to protect child video 
bloggers); Erin E. O’Neill, Influencing the Future: Compensating Children in the Age of Social-Media Influencer 
Marketing, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 42, 45 (2019), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/influencing-
the-future/ [https://perma.cc/W3PP-A2MT] (proposing that social media influencers be included under 
child actor laws to compensate children for their loss of privacy); Harper Lambert, Why Child Social Media 
Stars Need a Coogan Law to Protect Them From Parents, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 20, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/why-child-social-media-stars-need-a-coogan-law-protect-
parents-1230968 [https://perma.cc/7V6N-ZRUL] (reporting on the public discourse surrounding 
kidfluencer regulation); Wong, supra note 2 (discussing ongoing legislative efforts to improve Coogan laws); 
Mike Wright, YouTube ‘Kidfluencers’ at Risk of Exploitation, Children’s Commissioner Warns, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 
20, 2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/20/youtube-kidfluencers-risk-exploitation-
childrens-commissioner [https://perma.cc/7NXW-S25V] (describing efforts in the United Kingdom to 
regulate kidfluencers). 
24 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 § 186-2.1(e) (2017) (requiring child actors in 
New York to apply for a state-issued work permit); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11753(a) (2020) 
(requiring child actors in California to apply for a state-issued work permit); id. § 11760 (limiting 
the number of hours child actors may work in a day and mandating the number of hours of schooling 
they need per day); id. § 11755.2 (requiring studios to provide a teacher for minors while on set). 
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social media context, which is generally confined to the family unit. Thus, 
states should appropriately analyze these issues before simply including 
kidfluencers under existing child actor regulations. 
Part I discusses the rise of “influencing” as a multibillion-dollar industry, 
ripe for regulation. Part II provides an overview of the history of child labor 
laws to help explain why child actors, and likely kidfluencers by extension, 
are excluded from federal labor law coverage. This history has resulted in 
piecemeal regulation of child actors under state law, which becomes an issue 
given the mobile nature of social media production. Part III explains why 
social media production is work, not play, even though it is often performed 
at home within the family. This work makes child stars vulnerable to risks 
including financial exploitation, psychological harm, and unprecedented loss 
of privacy. While states have an interest in protecting kidfluencers from these 
harms, this context is uniquely family based, with parents often directing the 
production and using the platforms, not only for profit, but also as unpaid 
expression and recreation. Thus, states must balance parental rights against 
the interest in protecting child performers. Finally, Part IV proposes a partial-
protection plan that states should adopt. Financial protection is immediately 
possible through Coogan Laws, but regulating the content production itself 
presents new and challenging questions that require states to consider the 
specific needs of the social media industry. 
I. THE RISE OF KIDFLUENCERS 
“Samia’s birth video is on YouTube, so she’s pretty much been born into 
social media.”25 LaToya Ali, the mother of four-year-old influencer Samia, is 
not alone in introducing her child to the world of social media, even before 
birth. According to a 2010 study, more than 90% of two-year-olds in the 
United States have an online presence.26 This phenomenon of parents sharing 
content of their children, sometimes called “sharenting,” has garnered 
significant public concern.27 Still, a 2015 report by Pew Research Center found 
 
25 Maheshwari, supra note 11. 
26 Adrienne Lafrance, The Perils of ‘Sharenting’, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/babies-everywhere/502757 
[https://perma.cc/KN5V-QWD3]. 
27 See, e.g., id. (discussing the importance of online privacy for children); Anya Kamenetz, Opinion, The 
Problem with ‘Sharenting’, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/05/opinion/children-
internet-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/N98V-9USW] (describing the potentially damaging effects of 
sharenting, such as the selling of children’s personal information to advertisers and risking discovery of 
potentially damaging information about the child by future employers); Hua Hsu, Instagram, Facebook, and 
the Perils of “Sharenting”, NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-
comment/instagram-facebook-and-the-perils-of-sharenting [https://perma.cc/LLR4-DTZK] (discussing 
how sharenting exposes children to the larger digital world without their consent, robbing them of 
their agency). 
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that 75% of parents use social media, and 88% of all parents said they feel 
comfortable when content is posted about their child on social media.28 
The word “influencer” was added to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary in 
2019 and refers to “a person who is able to generate interest in something (such 
as a consumer product) by posting about it on social media.”29 Though 
influencing is a remarkably new phenomenon, a study found that 54% of 
surveyed Americans between the ages of 13 and 38 would become an influencer 
if they could and 86% are willing to post sponsored content for money.30 
“Kidfluencers” are children with large followings on social media and, 
most importantly to this Comment, who receive compensation for posting 
sponsored content.31 Twenty-five-year-old influencer Ross Smith described 
the rise of kidfluencers concisely: “Kids are the new social 
influencer . . . . Kids grow up and become less relevant. The sweet spot is 
between 2 and 4, [after which] they’re not that cute.”32 Indeed, research has 
shown that videos featuring a child under 13-years-old receive three times as 
many views as those without children.33 The social media marketing industry 
relies on parents dressing up their toddlers, feeding them lines that they may 
not understand, and advertising products that they may have never used. 
Whatever moral hesitation we have with the kidfluencer industry, the ship 
may well have sailed—the influencer marketing industry was worth as much 
as $8 billion in 2019 and is still expanding.34 One parent told The New York 
Times that their child can fetch up to $45,000 for posting a sponsored YouTube 
 
28 Maeve Duggan, Amanda Lenhart, Cliff Lampe & Nicole B. Ellison, Parents and Social 
Media, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 16, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/07/16/parents-
and-social-media/#fnref-13802-3 [https://perma.cc/FS5F-TCJB]. 
29 Influencer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influencer 
[https://perma.cc/2NTG-S3AV]. 
30 The Influencer Report: Engaging Gen Z and Millennials, MORNING CONSULT, 
https://morningconsult.com/influencer-report-engaging-gen-z-and-millennials/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5QZ-QQHC]; see also The LEGO Group Kicks Off Global Program to Inspire the 
Next Generation of Space Explorers as NASA Celebrates 50 Years of Moon Landing, LEGO (July 15, 2019), 
https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/news/2019/july/lego-group-kicks-off-global-program-to-
inspire-the-next-generation-of-space-explorers-as-nasa-celebrates-50-years-of-moon-landing 
[https://perma.cc/LU7L-5YUC] (referencing a survey of 3,000 children that found kids are three 
times more likely to aspire to be a YouTuber than an astronaut). 
31 See Maheshwari, supra note 11. 
32 Katherine Rosman, Why Isn’t Your Toddler Paying the Mortgage?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/style/viral-toddler-videos.html [https://perma.cc/5BSH-
STK4] (quoting Ross Smith). 
33 Patrick Van Kessel, Skye Toor & Aaron Smith, A Week in the Life of Popular YouTube Channels, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/07/25/a-week-in-the-
life-of-popular-youtube-channels/ [https://perma.cc/V3B6-DZAZ]. 
34 Schomer, supra note 10. 
584 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 577 
video.35 The highest-paid YouTuber in 2019 was eight-year-old Ryan Kaji, 
who made $26 million in one year for posting videos reviewing toys.36 
Kidfluencers make money in a few ways. First, they may receive 
compensation for sponsored content. Companies like Walmart, Mattel Toys, 
and Crayola will pay the child to post videos playing with their products as 
an advertising scheme.37 The second main source of income is Google 
AdSense,38 an advertising program that allows Google to run ads on 
influencers’ YouTube accounts and pays the influencer on a per-click basis.39 
Influencers also make money through merchandise and other related 
contracted work.40 
Given the potential for high sums of money, parents have a significant 
incentive to create as much content as possible. One family posted more than 
250 YouTube videos of their children in a four-year span,41 and Ryan Kaji’s 
channel accumulated at least 1830 videos42 over a five-year span.43 By my 
count at the time of writing, the Stauffer family, which has nearly 4 million 
Instagram followers, posted content of their young daughters on their 
Instagram account 142 times in 2019, not including temporary Instagram 
stories which delete after twenty-four hours or posts on other social media 
platforms.44 The Stauffers’ account features sponsored content and product 
placement by companies including Disney,45 Nickelodeon,46 and Amazon.47 
 
35 Maheshwari, supra note 11. 
36 Madeline Berg, The Highest-Paid YouTube Stars of 2019: The Kids are Killing It, FORBES (Dec. 
18, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/2019/12/18/the-highest-paid-youtube-
stars-of-2019-the-kids-are-killing-it [https://perma.cc/7RWP-NZVW]. 
37 Maheshwari, supra note 11. 
38 We Value Your Content, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start 
[https://perma.cc/Q5H2-FP2Z]. 
39 Gravier, supra note 11. 
40 See, e.g., Perelli, supra note 21 (reporting that, in 2019, YouTube star Ryan Kaji made $20 
million directly from YouTube, an additional $200 million in retail sales from branded products, and 
also starred in Nickelodeon and Roku shows that capitalized on his YouTube fame). 
41 Wright, supra note 23 (“Those videos have now been viewed more than five billion times and 
last year earned the channel more than £1.2 million in advertising revenue.”). 
42 YOUTUBE, youtube.com (search “Ryan’s World”) (last visited Dec. 3, 2020). 
43 Uploads, Videos in Ryan’s World, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com
/c/RyanToysReview/videos?view=0&sort=da&flow=grid [https://perma.cc/YSS4-ZCEV]. 
44 Stauffer Family (@kcstauffer), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/kcstauffer/?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/H9AK-V24C]. 
45 Stauffer Family (@kcstauffer), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 13, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/
p/B2XEhoagtq3/ (video of the children dancing with Mickey Mouse as a paid partnership with 
Disney Junior). 
46 Stauffer Family (@kcstauffer), INSTAGRAM (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/
p/B5_mW1tBVpF/ (picture of the kids watching Nickelodeon’s “Blue’s Clues & You” to promote its 
new episodes). 
47 Stauffer Family (@kcstauffer), INSTAGRAM (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/
p/BYE8sqWnz-8/ (picture of the daughters playing with art supplies to advertise Amazon’s back-to-
school offerings). 
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This industry introduces opportunities for wealth to virtually any family 
with a camera and internet access, and also the risk that parents seeking fame 
or money will exploit their children at the expense of education and welfare. 
In response to these concerns, there have been some lobbying efforts to 
protect kidfluencers under existing child actor laws, though these efforts have 
been primarily focused in California.48 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CHILD ACTOR LAW 
To understand how (and if) the child labor regime accommodates child 
actors and now social media influencers, we start by considering its origins. 
Advocates fought hard for federal child labor regulation, and for over eighty 
years, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 has protected American child 
workers from perhaps the most hazardous and exploitative occupations while 
symbolically prioritizing education over labor.49 But, as this Comment 
discusses, national child labor laws were never concerned with less traditional 
forms of labor and intentionally leave children exposed in certain industries. 
The underlying purposes of federal child labor law do not encompass 
social media work. Accordingly, like for child actors, protections for child 
social media stars are likely to be addressed on a state-by-state basis. This 
section discusses how child acting fell under the purview of state law and how 
states have attempted (or failed) to protect child performers. 
A. A Brief History of Child Labor Laws 
One need not look far back in American history to find the oppressive 
circumstances that motivated the child labor law movement. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, an estimated 400,000 children were employed in New 
York alone.50 The increase in the child labor force coincided with a national 
urbanization, so many children worked in industrial cities.51 Factory work 
involved sawdust-filled air, exposure to open fire, dangerous chemicals, and 
crude machinery.52 Because they were often given the least desirable jobs in 
these workplaces, one book estimated that boys under sixteen-years-old had 
 
48 See sources cited supra note 23. 
49 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, § 12, 52 Stat. 1060, 1067 (current version 
at 29 U.S.C. § 212). 
50 Seymour Moskowitz, Dickens Redux: How American Child Labor Law Became a Con Game, 10 
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 89, 102 (2010). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 103–04, 103 n.60. 
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twice as many workplace accidents as adult men and girls under sixteen had 
three times as many accidents as adult women.53 
Despite these clear dangers, much of the public was resistant to child labor 
regulations, in part because families relied on their children’s income.54 
Traditionally, and as this Comment will explore in relation to child actors, 
parents have the right to their child’s income, which incentivizes putting one’s 
child to work.55 This was important at the turn of the twentieth century when 
a large number of families were struggling economically.56 Thus, the 
American economy and family depended on child labor much more than is 
standard today. 
Even against this resistance to child labor restrictions, the early 1900s 
harbored unprecedented momentum in the child labor rights movement. This 
movement, paired with growing public concern over the dangers of child 
labor, led 42 states to adopt child labor legislation by 1906.57 At the federal 
level, however, attempts at labor reform were derailed by the Lochner era 
debates over federal power. When the federal Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) eventually passed and earned validation by the Court,58 it contained 
a child labor provision banning “oppressive child labor.”59 This meant that 
children under fourteen could not be employed, fourteen- and fifteen-year-
olds could work except under oppressive conditions, and sixteen- and 
 
53 EDWIN MARKHAM, BENJAMIN B. LINDSEY & GEORGE CREEL, CHILDREN IN BONDAGE 
158-59 (1914). 
54 See Moskowitz, supra note 50 at 101–02 (“Parents commonly sent their children to work and 
often opposed child labor reform because of the desperate need for additional income.”); VIVIANA 
A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD 66-70 (Princeton Univ. Press 1994) (1985) 
(discussing the middle-class resistance to child labor laws because of reliance on children’s income, 
especially when children could often make more money working than adults). 
55 See Eustice v. Plymouth Coal Co., 13 A. 975, 976 (Pa. 1888) (“It is a rule as old as the common 
law that the father is entitled to the custody and control of his minor children, and to receive their 
earnings.”); see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7503 (West 2020) (“The employer of a minor shall pay 
the earnings of the minor to the minor until the parent or guardian entitled to the earnings gives 
the employer notice that the parent or guardian claims the earnings.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.2 
(2020) (stating that parents are generally entitled to the earnings of their minor children); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 9:1-1 (West 2020) (same for New Jersey); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15.1-1 (2020) (same 
for Rhode Island). 
56 This was especially true for the more than ten million immigrants who moved to the United 
States between 1860–1890 and needed their children to work to make ends meet. See Moskowitz, 
supra note 50 at 101 n.49, 102 (citing OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 11, http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2002/IMM2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/54BB-5LVD]). At the 
same time, children in the post-Civil War South were encouraged to work in the growing textile 
mill industry as a cheap substitute for the men lost in the war. Id. at 101. 
57 41 CONG. REC. 1809–1810 (1907). 
58 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941). 
59 52 U.S. Stat. 1060, 1067 § 12(a)(1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 212). 
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seventeen-year-olds were only restricted from “particularly hazardous” 
occupations.60 
Today, the oppressive labor that the FLSA was built upon has largely 
disappeared in America. The great majority of work currently performed by 
children is in relatively safe industries, like babysitting and yardwork, and is 
concentrated outside of the school calendar.61 But still, approximately 150,000 
children are employed in violation of the FLSA in any given week, most often 
because they are working excessive hours or hazardous jobs before the age of 
eighteen.62 And just because the nature of the work has changed from 
industrial factories and mines to restaurants and retail does not mean that the 
law should cease to protect child workers from modern harms. 
B. Child Actor Protections 
Having reviewed the history of federal child labor protections, it should 
be no surprise that child acting is excluded from its scope. Since its origins, 
the FLSA has been limited to only “oppressive” child labor, and thus the Act 
categorically excludes certain employment.63 Relevant here, federal child 
labor laws do “not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in 
motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television 
productions.”64 
Child acting is exempted from the FLSA for two primary reasons. First, 
Congress did not consider child acting to be oppressive but rather an 
opportunity for children to develop talents.65 And second, child actress 
Shirley Temple had great fame during the statute’s construction and passing, 
and if Congress had barred children under 16 from acting, she would have 
been restricted from performing.66 The FLSA exemption for child actors has 
accordingly been coined “the Shirley Temple Act.”67 
Because of this federal exemption, child-actor law is state-based. This has 
resulted in wide variance among protections depending on where the child is 
 
60 Id. at 1061 § 3(l). 
61 HUGH D. HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 295-97 (2002); Michael 
Schuman, History of Child Labor in the United States—Part 2: The Reform Movement, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. (Jan. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/history-of-child-labor-in-the-united-
states-part-2-the-reform-movement.htm [https://perma.cc/CD6H-9N92]. 
62 HINDMAN, supra note 61 at 298. 
63 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)–(d) (providing the exemptions to federal child labor provisions, 
including certain agricultural workers, newspaper deliverers, child performers, and other specific 
jobs). 
64 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(3). 
65 82 Cong. Rec. 1780 (1937); 83 Cong. Rec. 7441 (1938). 
66 Kimberlianne Podlas, Does Exploiting a Child Amount to Employing a Child? The FLSA’s Child 
Labor Provisions and Children on Reality Television, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 39, 57-58 (2010). 
67 Id. at 58. 
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working, with states like California and New York providing rigorous 
protections, and states like Mississippi providing no specific protections at 
all.68 Indeed, seventeen states do not regulate child entertainment 
employment, and twenty-four states do not require children to have work 
permits for entertainment work.69 Thus, child actors in America have been 
subject to unequal and often insufficient protection depending on where their 
work is performed. 
Kidfluencers would likely fall under the same FLSA exemption because 
they share the relevant characteristics of child acting—namely that 
entertainment work is often viewed as non-oppressive labor that actually 
benefits children more than it harms them.70 Alternatively, kidfluencers may 
not receive protection because the FLSA also exempts children employed by 
their parents from child labor regulation.71 Though it is debatable whether 
kidfluencers are in fact employed by their parents, both of these exemptions 
are conceivable grounds to exclude kidfluencers from FLSA coverage. 
Even so, social media production is particularly suited for federal 
regulation and may merit its own legislation to circumscribe the FLSA 
exemptions. Internet entertainment and advertising are necessarily 
interstate.72 And because of the mobility of social media content production, 
a state-based regime presents a real risk of forum-shopping that could be 
prevented with a federal scheme. Nevertheless, this Comment focuses on 
possible state regulation of the social media industry because of its similarities 
to child acting, which has never been federally regulated. 
 
68 Child Entertainment Laws as of January 1, 2020, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor/entertainment [https://perma.cc/H4FB-L47M]. 
69 Id. 
70 See 82 CONG. REC. 1780 (1937) (“Employment of these few children gives us pleasant and 
wholesome entertainment and the child is given the opportunity of displaying his or her talent which 
they love.”). 
71 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(l) (excluding children employed by parents from the definition of 
“oppressive child labor”); 29 CFR § 570.126 (2020) (explaining that the exclusion applies to children 
in most industries as long as they are employed exclusively by the parent and not any secondary 
employer). Though neither New York nor California exempt parents employing their own children 
from child labor regulations (except for certain industries, like farming), a state could choose to do 
so, which creates even greater need for new legislation for kidfluencers. See, e.g., 5 VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 40.1-79.01 (2020) (exempting children employed by their parents in occupations other than 
manufacturing from child labor provisions). 
72 Congress said as much in its findings that “[t]he Internet is well recognized as a method of 
distributing goods and services across State lines” and “using the Internet constitutes transportation 
in interstate commerce.” Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, 
§ 102(6)–(7), 122 Stat. 4001, 4002 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251). 
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C. Development of Coogan Laws 
California is credited with spearheading child-actor protections through 
the enactment of its Coogan Law.73 Jackie Coogan was a famous child 
comedian who starred in Charlie Chaplin’s film The Kid in 1919.74 Upon his 
twenty-first birthday, after his film career had ended, he discovered his 
parents had drained his earnings.75 In California at the time, parents owned 
the earnings of their minor children, so Coogan had to sue his mother and 
former manager to recover some of his earnings.76 In response, California 
enacted its so-called Coogan Law in 1939.77 
Coogan Law refers to the state requirement that the parent or guardian 
of the child actor set up a blocked trust account for the child, into which 15% 
of the minor’s acting wages are deposited until the child turns 18 years old.78 
For most of the twentieth century, California’s Coogan Law had a serious 
flaw—Coogan trusts could only be created upon court approval of the 
contract.79 This meant that, in 1999, about 95% of contracts with child 
entertainers did not have Coogan protection because many families never 
sought court approval.80 In the 5% where court approval was sought, it was 
typically by the employer out of concern that the child would attempt to avoid 
the contract and not out of interest in protecting the child.81 
In 1999, California amended its law to no longer require court approval 
and, quite significantly, to give sole property rights to the child for all 
earnings generated under the employment contract.82 Today, California’s 
Coogan Law is expansive—it requires entertainment employers to receive the 
written consent of the state Labor Commissioner to employ a minor under 
sixteen and to deposit 15% of the child’s gross earnings into a blocked trust.83 
 
73 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020). 




77 See 1939 Cal. Stat. ch. 637, § 1, at 2064-65 (1939) (California’s first Coogan Law). 
78 As originally enacted in 1939, courts had discretion to choose what percentage of earnings 
should be directed to the trust account. Id. Today, California specifies that 15% must be set aside for 
the child’s trust. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020). 
79 Peter M. Christiano, Saving Shirley Temple: An Attempt to Secure Financial Futures for Child 
Performers, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 204 n.28 (2000). 
80 Id. 
81 Id; see also, Podlas, supra note 66 at 70 n.253 (“The limited body of case law on the subject 
suggests that the Coogan law provided far more protection to film makers than to child actors.”) 
(quoting Marc R. Staenberg & Daniel K. Stuart, Children as Chattels: The Disturbing Plight of Child 
Performers, BEVERLY HILLS BUS. ASS’N J., Summer/Fall 1997). 
82 S.B. 1162, 1999 Leg. (Cal. 1999) (enacted); see also Christiano, supra note 79, at 206 (“The 
child’s family no longer has the right to claim a portion of the child’s earnings for family use.”). 
83 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020). 
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If the child actor’s parents do not set up a Coogan trust, the employer will 
send the money to the state’s Coogan Fund, and the actor can retrieve the 
earnings upon turning eighteen-years-old.84 
But, like for kidfluencers, harms to child actors are not just financial. 
Historically, child actors often faced long hours and dangerous working 
conditions that harmed both physical and mental well-being.85 To address 
this, states like California impose hour restrictions on how long each age 
group can be on set in a given day86 and educational requirements, like 
requiring a teacher to be on set.87 In California, the studio teacher is 
responsible for representing the child’s interest in “working conditions, 
physical surroundings, signs of the minor’s mental and physical fatigue, and 
the demands placed upon the minor.”88 
Notably for the purposes of this Comment, California defines the 
“entertainment industry” to include any organization employing a minor in 
“[m]otion pictures of any type . . . using any format . . . by any medium . . .; 
photography, recording, modeling, theatrical, productions; publicity; rodeos; 
circuses; musical performances; and any other performances.”89 This 
definition is arguably broad enough to capture social media production, but 
given the novel and powerful social media marketing industry, it was surely 
not contemplated by the statutes of any state, and states are not currently 
applying actor laws to social media production. 
In 2018, California Assemblymember Kansen Chu proposed a bill that 
would have specifically expanded child actor protections to cover social media 
production.90 By the time it passed the Assembly and was signed by the 
 
84 Id. (stating that if the parent or guardian does not supply employer with Coogan account 
information within 180 days of the employment, “the employer shall forward to The Actors’ Fund 
of America 15 percent of the minor’s gross earnings” and the Fund must make one attempt to contact 
the child once they turn eighteen by sending a notice to the child’s last known address). 
85 In perhaps the most extreme case, two child actors in “The Twilight Zone” series were killed 
on set while filming a scene involving a helicopter and an exploding building. See Charles S. Tashiro, 
The “Twilight” Zone of Contemporary Hollywood Production, CINEMA J., Spring 2002, at 27. It was 
later discovered that these children were working illegally outside of the permitted working hours 
for child actors. Id. In response to this tragedy, California revised its child acting rules to clarify 
what activities are not permissible or too dangerous, though it also extended the number of hours a 
child actor may work. Id. at 35. 
86 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11760 (2020) (ranging from children under six months of age, 
who are only allowed to work for twenty minutes per day, to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, who 
can work up to six hours per day). 
87 Id. (mandating how many hours of schooling child actors need per day); CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 8, § 11755.2 (2020) (requiring studios to provide a teacher for minors while on set). 
88 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11755.3 (2020). 
89 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11751(a) (2020). 
90 Chu’s News—September 2018, ASSEMBLYMEMBER KANSEN CHU DIST. 25 (Sept. 19, 2018, 10:30 
AM), https://a25.asmdc.org/district-report/chus-news-september-2018 [https://perma.cc/89C9-6BUF]; A.B. 
2388, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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Governor to become law, any mention of social media was removed. As 
California learned through the bill’s failure, states should create regulation 
more specific to the social media industry, rather than extending current child 
acting laws to identically cover social media production. 
III. WEIGHING HARM TO KIDFLUENCERS AGAINST THE RIGHT 
TO PARENTAL AUTHORITY 
Having surveyed the historic goals and development of child labor law, it 
is clear that the regime did not contemplate the meteoric rise of the social 
media marketing industry. There have been some calls for kidfluencer 
protection, but the proposals generally suggest simply extending existing 
state child actor and Coogan laws to cover social media production.91 While 
kidfluencers are probably not included under the FLSA protection for the 
same reasons that child actors are exempted,92 this Comment will show that 
it may also be impracticable to apply state child actor laws to kidfluencers 
because this industry has unique harms and family law implications. 
This Part discusses how producing sponsored social media content is 
work, even though it is conducted at home. It goes on to highlight the many 
harms the industry inflicts on kidfluencers to show that some regulation is 
needed. However, it also recognizes the constitutional right that parents have 
to direct the activities and upbringing of their children, ultimately concluding 
that the social media context requires legislators to weigh the interest in 
protecting children from harm with a parent’s right to choose the activities of 
their child in a way that is distinct from traditional child acting. 
A. A New Kind of Home-Work 
Unlike traditional child acting, which typically occurs at a studio or theater 
with a production team, social media production often takes place at home 
with the family. One reason for this may be that platforms like YouTube, 
TikTok, and Instagram do not allow children under the age of 13 to make their 
own accounts, so the parents must be involved.93 More practically, many 
kidfluencers are too young to be able to write or produce their own content, 
 
91 See, e.g., Cal. A.B. 2388 (proposing to “include digital exhibitions under those conditions” 
of existing child acting laws). 
92 See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text; see also Podlas, supra note 66 (arguing that 
children on reality television programs do not fall under the FLSA for many of the reasons 
kidfluencers do not either). 
93 Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/
static?gl=CA&template=terms [https://perma.cc/PSB9-VK58]; Legal, TIKTOK (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.tiktok.com/legal/terms-of-use?lang=en [https://perma.cc/QMP7-CANV]; Terms of Use, 
INSTAGRAM (April 19, 2018), https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870 [https://perma.cc/8UW5-KG5A]. 
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so it has to be a family affair. As an illustration, a CBS Originals documentary 
shows parents feeding lines to their children who cannot even pronounce the 
word “influencer,” let alone know that they are influencers.94 
Because the content creation is often managed by the parents, the 
company that contracted the work has almost no control when compared to a 
traditional film set. The parents often organize the photoshoots, film the 
videos, direct their children, post the content, and ultimately control the 
timeline.95 The parents, then, have almost complete control over the 
conditions of the child’s work. 
Parents of kidfluencers have insisted that their children are not working—
they are playing. In news interviews, parents often claim they are the ones 
completing the work by negotiating contracts and creating the content,96 and 
the kids are just “having fun.”97 There is some appeal to this view—social 
media content often purports to be capturing the child’s normal activities, 
rather than a rehearsed performance. If we view the content production as a 
child simply being handed a toy to play with while the parents passively film 
it, the circumstances feel much less demanding of the child’s time and skill 
than traditional child acting. And even if rehearsal or memorization is 
required for the content, it may be tempting to liken parents filming their 
children for social media to parents enrolling their children in ballet to 
perform for an audience or in football to play for a crowd. 
But the industry has now progressed to a point where the production of 
this content cannot just be considered play—it is work. These children are 
appearing in hundreds of posts per year,98 and the child provides the value to 
company sponsors.99 The content may be designed to appear like the child is 
playing, but the production still requires the child to use a specific product, 
perhaps even by a specific deadline, and be filmed doing it for monetary gain. 
As an illustration, one parent reported, “If there’re days [the kids are] totally 
 
94 Taylor Mooney, Companies Make Millions Off Kid Influencers, and the Law Hasn’t Kept Up, 
CBSN ORIGINALS (Aug. 26, 2019, 6:19 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kid-influencers-
companies-make-millions-law-hasnt-kept-up-cbsn-originals [https://perma.cc/XW87-WJVM]. 
95 See, e.g., Allie Volpe, How Parents of Child Influencers Package Their Kids’ Lives for Instagram, 
THE ATL. (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/inside-lives-child-
instagram-influencers/583675 [https://perma.cc/9UYB-NFN6] (“[The mother] manages [her 
daughter’s] career without an agent, fields all collaborative deals herself—[the child] earns anywhere 
from $100 to $5,000 a post—and styles and photographs her toddler.”). 
96 See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 94 (“They say it’s a family endeavor, their kids are having fun, 
and it should not necessarily be considered ‘labor.’”); Wong, supra note 2 (“The thing I always stress 
is that we [the parents] work, the girls do not.”). 
97 Volpe, supra note 95. 
98 See, e.g., Ryan’s World, supra note 42 (accumulating 1,830 videos since its creation in 2015); 
Stauffer Family, supra note 44 (posting more than 142 Instagram pictures in 2019). 
99 See Van Kessel et al., supra note 33 (showing that videos featuring a child under the age of 
thirteen receive three times as many views as those without children). 
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not into it, they don’t have to be . . . [u]nless it’s paid work. Then they have 
to be there.”100 Ultimately, these children are being contracted to provide a 
service on a schedule for compensation. Under these circumstances, play has 
become work. 
B. A Snapshot of Harms Facing Kidfluencers 
Given that the nature of the work itself varies between traditional child 
actors and social media influencers, the harms these workers face also differ 
in certain respects. All child performers face some common harms—missing 
school, losing privacy, and exerting labor at an age where they have less 
personal agency. But the social media context introduces an additional host 
of harms, most notably the total lack of financial protection and the health 
risks associated with interactive media and extreme loss of privacy.101 This 
section explores these harms to demonstrate the need for some level of 
regulation in the social media marketing industry. 
1. Financial Exploitation 
The risk of exploitation in the social media context is double-barreled—
children face exploitation by both their parents and by the companies that 
sponsor them. Social media provides every parent who has access to the 
internet with the potential, and perhaps delusion, of making millions of dollars 
by commercializing their children. Companies capitalize on this: toy-company 
Melissa & Doug offered payments and free toys to any family willing to post 
content of their children playing with the company’s products, and the family 
would be compensated based on how many followers they had.102 
The relative accessibility of social media fame is exasperated by the trend 
in parents exploiting their children, not only for money, but also for fame and 
celebrity.103 There is a demonstrated willingness by some parents to push 
their children in the pursuit of social media fame: “Once we got to that age 
that [my son] resisted a lot, I shifted more to my daughter . . . . She is a little 
 
100 Wong, supra note 2. 
101 See infra notes 102–117 and accompanying text. 
102 Maheshwari, supra note 11 (“The company said it would pay $10 per 1,000 followers for 
individual Instagram posts and $5 per 1,000 followers for Instagram Story posts.”). 
103 See Ramon Ramirez, What will it Take?: In the Wake of the Outrageous “Balloon Boy” Hoax, A 
Call to Regulate the Long-Ignored Issue of Parental Exploitation of Children, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J., 
617, 620 (2011) (“[N]ot only [are] children viewed as sources of money, but also as a means of 
achieving fame and celebrity.”). 
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workhorse.”104 As we saw, the Hobson family is a tragic example of the 
dangers of exploitation by parents.105 
Kidfluencers are at particular risk of financial exploitation because there 
are no regulations protecting their earnings. Unless their parents voluntarily 
allow it, there is currently no mechanism to provide kidfluencers with legal 
ownership of their earnings from social media content. These children, who 
are essential to their channels’ successes, are sacrificing privacy and exerting 
hours of labor each week while maintaining no legal right to their 
compensation. Especially if their social media work prevents the child from 
excelling in school or developing other skills, or even causes widely known 
reputational harm, their parents’ decision to make them a kidfluencer can 
have serious long-term financial effects. 
Moreover, kidfluencers are likely not considered “employees” of the 
companies that sponsor them because the companies have no real control over 
the child’s work.106 This means they may not be covered under most 
employment statutes, thus lacking protections like wage standards, workers 
compensation, and the right to unionize under the National Labor Relations 
Act.107 Presumably, many of these parents are unsophisticated contract 
negotiators, yet they may have to handle contracting on their child’s behalf 
without the support of strong collectives or lobbying groups.108 
Some states attempt to protect child actors from financial harm through 
Coogan Laws,109 but again, no states currently require Coogan trusts for social 
 
104 Rosman, supra note 32. 
105 Supra notes 2–5; see also, Mooney, supra note 94 (capturing the phenomenon of parents 
using their children for fame when the father of a well-known kidfluencer said, “[m]y goal in life is 
to become as famous as possible.”). 
106 See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)) (explaining that status as an “employee” depends on many 
factors centered on employer control over the work). 
107 Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act excludes nonemployees, specifically 
independent contractors, from the Act’s coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Accordingly, nonemployees 
do not enjoy the same rights to collectively bargain that employees do under Section 7. Id. § 157. 
108 See, e.g., Volpe, supra note 95 (reporting that the mother of a kidfluencer who makes up to 
$500 per post manages all sponsorship deals for her daughter without the assistance of an agent). 
109 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (2020) (“[T]he court shall require that 15 percent of the minor’s 
gross earnings pursuant to the contract be set aside by the minor’s employer, except an employer of a 
minor for services as an extra, background performer, or in a similar capacity, as described in [an 
earlier section].”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-620(b)(1) (2019) (establishing the amount of the minor’s 
gross income that is required to be set aside); LA. STAT. ANN. (2020) (“Monies placed in a trust fund 
. . . shall be placed in a blocked account and no funds shall be withdrawn prior to the date the minor 
attains the age of eighteen unless the minor is determined to be in necessitous circumstances by a 
court of competent jurisdiction.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-19 (2020) (“Whenever a child is 
employed in the performing arts, the child’s parent, guardian or trustee shall establish a trust account 
in the child’s state of residence for the benefit of the child within seven business days after the child’s 
employment contract is signed, and the employer shall deposit fifteen percent of the child’s gross 
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media influencers. Even though Coogan trusts do nothing to prevent 
bargaining disparities or underpayment, they at least ensure that the child 
receives some compensation for their talent and efforts. 
2. Health Risks 
The public nature of social media, as well as the industry’s reliance on 
peer approval, presents health risks to kidfluencers. Unsurprisingly given the 
industry’s novelty, there is not much information on the psychological effects 
of kidfluencing, or even adult influencing, outside of anecdotal accounts. 
While studies have indicated that social media use in general is linked with 
poor body image, negative self-concept, and depression among young 
people,110 there are no conclusive studies showing the effects social media 
fame can have on a child star. 
Perhaps the most parallel context is that of reality television stars,111 though 
the fact that reality television is directed and filmed by a production studio 
rather than parents seems relevant to analyzing psychological harms. 
Nevertheless, both engagements expose children to the “loss of privacy and 
potential for humiliation.”112 Moreover, both purport to represent the child in 
their authentic nature, which can cause harm to children still forming their self-
identity while subjected to criticism about their persona from a large audience.113 
The extreme loss of privacy that social media influencers experience is a 
unique threat to these children’s mental health and physical safety. Unlike 
traditional child actors, social media influencers often film in their own 
homes, use their real names, and share their daily routines.114 Plus, the sheer 
 
earnings directly into the child’s trust account.”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 186 (2020) 
(outlining various protections for finances and wellbeing of children). 
110 Joseph Firth, John Torous, Brendon Stubbs, Josh A. Firth, Genevieve Z. Steiner, Lee 
Smith, Mario Alvarez-Jimenez, John Gleeson, Davy Vancampfort, Christopher J. Armitage & 
Jerome Sarris, The “Online Brain,”: How the Internet May Be Changing Our Cognition, 18 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 119, 125 (2019); see Maeve Duggan, Experiencing Online Harassment, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(July 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/07/11/experiencing-online-harassment 
[https://perma.cc/U8UP-Y6GL] (finding that 37% of Americans between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-nine report “someone has tried to purposefully embarrass them” on social media, and 67% of 
young adults say they were subjected to some form online harassment). 
111 See DANA MITCHELL, ASSEMBLY COMM. ON ARTS, ENT., SPORTS, TOURISM, & 
INTERNET MEDIA, AB 2388, at 3 (Cal. 2018) (analyzing California’s proposed kidfluencer bill and 
highlighting a parallel between social media influencers and reality TV stars). 
112 Podlas, supra note 66 at 44-45 (discussing the harms to wellbeing that young reality television 
participants face); see Duggan, supra note 110 (discussing online harassment). 
113 Katherine Neifeld, More than a Minor Inconvenience: The Case for Heightened Protection for 
Children Appearing on Reality Television, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 447, 451-52 (2010). 
114 For example, many influencers will post YouTube videos claiming to take the viewers 
through their normal, daily routines. See, e.g., The Labrant Fam, Our Morning Routine!!! (Get Ready 
with Us), YOUTUBE (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xKBfqcgJZ1c 
[https://perma.cc/YQY3-UP84] (video of two adults and their young daughter waking up and 
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volume of content that influencers are expected to post means that they are 
on-camera and in front of audiences constantly. 
Further, the ability for audiences to message kidfluencers directly on 
social media puts these children at heightened risk of online harassment and 
stalking. The wall between celebrities and the public is thin in the social 
media context, where audiences can communicate with them directly through 
the platform and track the stars’ locations.115 Stories of severe online 
harassment are countless, with influencers and celebrities recounting death 
threats, body shaming, disability and identity-based insults, and other 
personal forms of harassment. 116 This Comment cannot sufficiently explore 
the harms to child social media stars, but it is becoming clear that the short-
lived fame of the platform can have serious health consequences.117 
 
getting ready for the day, with 8,856,584 views at the time of writing); The ACE Family, THE REAL 
LIFE OF THE ACE FAMILY – “WELCOME TO OUR LIFE”, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMsSd7AUNFs [https://perma.cc/6ZVP-62C6] 
(documentary-style video where the couple takes viewers through their old dwellings, financial 
history, and home videos of their young daughter, with 12,655,555 views at the time of writing). 
115 Both Facebook and Instagram allow users to message one another, similar to texting, as well 
as pinpoint their location on their posts. But even if a celebrity declines to disclose their location, 
cyberstalkers and other followers can use the background of the pictures and, in one extreme case, 
even the reflection of the eyes to identify where the picture was taken. Marie C. Baca, Your 
Smartphone Takes Amazing Selfies. Those Selfies Could Tell Stalkers Where You Live., WASH. POST (Oct. 
16, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/16/your-smartphone-
takes-amazing-selfies-those-selfies-could-tell-stalkers-where-you-live [https://perma.cc/85QB-
9UYW] (“[A] man allegedly stalked a Japanese pop star after determining her location based on 
reflections seen in her eyes in social media posts . . . . Those images helped the suspect find her train 
station. He then used Google Street View . . . to find her home.”). 
116 See Taylor Lorenz, Instagram has a Massive Harassment Problem, THE ATL. (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/10/instagram-has-massive-harassment-
problem/572890 [https://perma.cc/NR78-AZTR] (discussing how celebrity influencers are harassed 
while using social media platforms). 
117 See Jenni Gritters, How Instagram Takes a Toll on Influencers’ Brains, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 
8, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/08/instagram-influencers-
psychology-social-media-anxiety [https://perma.cc/BUG4-F3MM] (“[M]aking Instagram a reliable 
part of your income is a taxing process, and it can take a serious psychological toll.”); Sam Blum, 
The Fatigue Hitting Influencers as Instagram Evolves, BBC WORKLIFE (Oct. 21, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20191022-the-fatigue-hitting-influencers-as-instagram-
evolves [https://perma.cc/LLK8-M5VU] (recounting the stressful lifestyles of online influencers 
and the disturbing toll it can take on wellbeing and mental health). 
Recently, two former contestants and one former host on the reality TV show Love Island died 
by suicide, to the shock of their devoted fanbase. Derrick Bryson Taylor, Caroline Flack, Who Hosted 
“Love Island,” Dies by Suicide at 40, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/15/arts/caroline-flack-dead.html [https://perma.cc/BPJ9-XYJ6]. Though the social media 
industry is relatively new, it has parallels to reality TV in the privacy and fame impact on the stars. 
The mental health harm inflicted by the short-lived fame of reality television stars and, we can 
expect, social media stars cannot be understated. 
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C. Constitutional Right to Family Autonomy 
Even with these identifiable harms, the fact that social media production 
occurs within the home and family unit raises constitutional questions about 
potential regulations. The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutional 
right to parental authority in 1923, when it determined that the right “to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a protected liberty interest 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.118 This view was affirmed two years later, 
when the Court recognized “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control.”119 Thus was born 
a tradition of family autonomy immune from invasive state interference in 
the upbringing of one’s child. 
However, some twenty years after the inception of the right to parental 
authority, the Court clarified that this right is not without limits. The seminal 
case is Prince v. Massachusetts, where the child’s custodian permitted her to 
work in violation of the state’s child labor laws.120 The Court recognized a 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,” specifically 
concerning a parent’s decisions in raising their children.121 However, it also 
recognized that “the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare,” and that child 
labor can be subject to more regulation than adult labor.122 
Today, parental authority is exceedingly far-reaching.123 Parents can 
choose what religious and moral ideas their child is exposed to,124 who their 
child interacts with,125 and what extracurricular activities they are involved 
in.126 These decisions are generally not reviewed by courts or agencies except 
in circumstances like custody disputes or serious harm to the child.127 Still, 
 
118 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
119 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
120 321 U.S. 158, 160 (1944). 
121 Id. at 166. 
122 Id. at 167-68. 
123 But cf. Patrick Henigan, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public High Schools Which Provide Gay 
and Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional Childrearing Rights of Parents, 62 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1996) (positing that constitutional parental authority protects four categorical 
“areas of parenting” rather than a penumbra of parental functions). 
124 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (clarifying that the constitutional right to 
parental authority includes “the inculcation of moral standards [and] religious beliefs”). 
125 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (“[T]he parents should be the ones to choose 
whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas.”). 
126 See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794,796 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to limit a parent’s 
constitutional right to raise a child under their sincere religious beliefs, even if the parent does not 
allow the child to “participate in extracurricular activities, socialize with [people outside of their 
religious group], or attend college”). 
127 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (“Simply because the decision of a 
parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the 
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like in Prince, states can and have limited parental authority where there is a 
significant interest in the health and welfare of children, including regulations 
like truancy laws and vaccination mandates.128 
Thus, the constitutional right to parental authority limits, but not 
necessarily prohibits, potential state regulation of kidfluencers. Opponents of 
kidfluencer regulations may emphasize that social media production largely 
takes place at home, directed by the parents. Filming one’s child and creating 
an online presence for them is arguably within a parent’s liberty to control 
the upbringing of their child. Moreover, social media has dual functions for 
influencers as both a source of income and a platform for self-expression. 
Both Meyer and Society of Sisters upheld parental rights in part because of the 
interest in self-expression and the heterogeneity of society.129 These 
important considerations of family autonomy and self-expression may cast 
doubt on some production regulations, like limiting the hours that a family 
can create self-expressive content together, but they do not implicate financial 
regulation. 
On the other hand, proponents of regulation can rely on the limiting 
factors of parental authority. The Court in Prince established that states have 
the power to protect children from harm, even above the wishes of their 
parents, and specified child labor as an appropriate area of regulation.130 
States have a substantial interest in cabining the harms these child social 
media stars face, and a court could find that this outweighs any infringement 
on parental authority.131 It may follow, then, that imposing some level of 
regulation on the work conditions and compensation of kidfluencers is well 
within the state’s authority. 
There is no easy answer to the question of how far state regulation of 
kidfluencer production can go—states will have to grapple with the 
constitutional issues in ways that they do not for traditional child actors. 
 
power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state . . . . Neither 
state officials nor federal courts are equipped to review such parental decisions.”). 
128 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48260-48260.5 (2020) (providing that, if a student misses 
three days of school with no excuse, the pupil is truant and the parents are reminded that they are 
“obligated to compel the attendance of the pupil at school,” and failure to meet this obligation may 
subject them to prosecution); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120335 (2020) (mandating certain 
immunizations for admission to public and private schools, though not for home schooling). 
129 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (acknowledging that the state may desire 
a homogeneous population, but people retain the liberty to learn and practice what they desire); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (precluding from states the general power “to 
standardize its children”). 
130 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 168 (1944). 
131 See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 541, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (limiting 
parental authority to “intimate family decisions” and holding, in any event, that parents “retain 
ample authority” over their children even if there is a mandatory curfew) (quoting Schleifer v. City 
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
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Legislators should be conscious of this when crafting social media protections 
because, in some ways, regulating kidfluencers is exerting state power over the 
activities of a parent and their child in their own home. Still, because content 
production often qualifies as labor and subjects these children to serious 
harms, some level of regulation surely passes muster. The task, then, is to 
establish the boundaries of what social media production should be considered 
labor and determine what kinds of regulations are practicable in this novel 
landscape. 
IV. PARTIAL-PROTECTION PROPOSAL 
Because the substantial differences between social media influencing and 
child acting imbue the former with a distinct host of dangers and family-law 
considerations, states should not simply include kidfluencers under existing 
child acting laws (assuming the state even has any regulations in place). 
Though child acting laws vary among states, there are three common 
categories of regulation: Coogan trusts, work permits, and workplace 
conditions. At this point in the public debate and development of social 
media marketing, it is practicable and desirable to provide financial protection 
to kidfluencers in the form of Coogan trusts. But regulation beyond that will 
require more research and analysis given the concerns of over-regulating the 
family unit and interfering with the uniquely fast-paced social media market. 
States should not regulate social media production through labor law when 
the content is unpaid because, on balance, the interest in parental authority 
over the activities of their family outweighs the risk of exploitation.132 Even 
for kidfluencers and their parents, social media is an outlet for self-expression, 
art, and socialization. They should have the same rights to that noncommercial 
expression as the general public. Of course, every post is valuable in creating 
a brand, so one could imagine a system where every social media user who 
earns any money on their account must adhere to permit and workplace 
requirements for all content. But that overextends the regulation and does not 
give proper weight to family autonomy. 
Even so, these children need some level of protection, and this Comment 
argues the appropriate line to separate personal expression and actual work is 
when content is created for money. When the child is being paid to produce 
content, they are at real and immediate risk of exploitation, and financial 
regulations, like Coogan laws, are appropriate. However, other requirements 
that states typically impose on child actors and their studios, like work 
 
132 States like New York require work permits for child actors even when the work is unpaid. 
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFFS. LAW § 35.01 (McKinney 2020) (applying the child-actor permit 
requirements to performances “whether or not such child or any other person is to be compensated”). 
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permits and on-set education, are difficult, if not impossible, to apply to the 
social media context as they currently exist. 
A. Coogan Trusts 
Though it may not be clear how much states should oversee the 
production of social media content, states can readily provide financial 
protection to kidfluencers through Coogan trusts. Parents are typically 
charged with protecting their children financially, but parental motives 
become perverse when they stand to gain millions on their child’s social media 
content. Requiring Coogan trusts for kidfluencers protects them from the 
same financial plight that countless child stars before them endured at the 
hands of their parents.133 In the interest of intrinsic fairness, these children 
should be guaranteed compensation for their labor and loss of privacy, and 
Coogan trusts ensure that. 
California, New York, Louisiana, and New Mexico all have Coogan Laws 
that require 15% of gross earnings to be deposited in a trust account for the 
child actor.134 One could argue that the percentage should be lower in the 
social media context because parents perform a higher percentage of the total 
work than stage parents—negotiating contracts, setting up shoots, posting the 
content, and more—and are therefore entitled to a higher percentage of their 
child’s earnings. But we should look at the percentage from the perspective 
of how much compensation the child deserves. These children are arguably 
more vital to the content earnings than traditional child actors, and they are 
subject to more pervasive privacy harms.135 Accordingly, the percentage 
should at least match that of child actors. 
Even with a strong policy interest in requiring Coogan trusts for 
kidfluencers, the industry is complicated because of the massive volume of 
influencers and because social media accounts can be used both for profit and 
as a personal hobby. For example, there were about 3.7 million brand-
sponsored posts on Instagram in 2018, and that figure has been exponentially 
 
133 Shirley Temple, Jackie Coogan, Dana Plato, Gary Coleman, Macaulay Culkin, Drew 
Barrymore, and Mary-Kate and Ashley Olsen all found themselves in a “financial battle with their 
parents after a star-studded career due to exploitation or poor money management by their parents, 
agents or managers.” Shayne J. Heller, The Price of Celebrity: When a Child’s Star-Studded Career 
Amounts to Nothing, 10 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 161, 164 n.23 (1999). 
134 For examples of laws requiring trusts for child actors, see CAL. FAM CODE § 6752(b)(West 
2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-620(b)(1) (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2133 (2020); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-6-19 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 §§ 186-1.1, 186-3.5. 
135 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text (pointing out the additional privacy concerns 
that come with social media fame). 
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rising.136 Enforcing Coogan requirements on each of those posts that includes 
a child would be a colossal undertaking. Plus, it may be less urgent to regulate 
social media users who only post sponsored content for low dollar amounts 
on the assumption that these children are not subject to the same long hours, 
constant loss of privacy, or high-stress productions that a more 
commercialized account may demand. 
Accordingly, states should adopt the model of Louisiana and New Mexico, 
which only require employers to deposit money into a Coogan trust for 
contracts over a threshold amount.137 New Mexico only requires funds to be 
deposited into a Coogan trust for contracts earning $1,000 or more, but states 
should adopt a threshold amount closer to Louisiana’s $500 because individual 
social media posts are often worth lower dollar figures than roles in entire 
stage or movie productions.138 
Setting a threshold amount where Coogan trusts become required is 
appropriate in this context because it only regulates those children at risk of 
financial exploitation, thus minimizing state intrusion on the family unit. 
That is, if a kidfluencer can collect $500 or more for a single post, it is likely 
they have amassed a following and significant online presence,139 thereby 
triggering the concerns of financial exploitation and other harms mentioned 
earlier.140 But the threshold excludes families who may use social media 
primarily as a hobby and have not developed the level of commercial 
operation that puts these children at significant risk. Moreover, the parents 
of kidfluencers may be less sophisticated in entertainment regulation than a 
child-actor agent, for example, and until their child is making significant 
 
136 Instagram Influencer Marketing is a $1.7 Billion Dollar Industry, MEDIAKIX (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://mediakix.com/blog/instagram-influencer-marketing-industry-size-how-big/ 
[https://perma.cc/DB99-2MAZ ]. 
137 LA. STAT. ANN.§ 51:2132 (2020) (“The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to any 
contract in which a minor is employed or agrees to render artistic or creative services for 
compensation of five hundred dollars or more	 . . . .”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-6-19(I) (2020) 
(“[Coogan Laws] appl[y] only to contracts in an amount equal to or greater than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000) in gross earnings.”). 
138 “Nano-influencers,” defined as having between 500 and 5,000 followers, may accept products 
in lieu of payment for sponsored posts and, when accepting cash, make an average of $315 per YouTube 
video and $100 per picture posted to Instagram. Blake Droesch, How Much Are Brands Paying Influencers?, 
EMARKETER (July 16, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/how-much-are-brands-paying-
influencers [https://perma.cc/RU64-8ZML]. “Power influencers,” with 30,000 to 500,000 followers, 
make on average $782 per YouTube video and $507 per Instagram picture. Id. In contrast, the primary 
actors union standardizes pay for a single day of theatrical performing at $1,030. SAG-AFTRA Theatrical 
Wage Table, SAG-AFTRA, https://www.sagaftra.org/files/20202023CBAWages.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZJV2-8TCQ]. 
139 $507 per post puts an influencer in the category of “power influencer” with up to 500,000 
followers. Droesch, supra note 135. 
140 Supra notes 101–17 and accompanying text. 
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money, the state should not expect them to know regulations as niche as 
Coogan Laws. 
Still, there are many questions left open. Influencers often have several 
social media accounts, and kidfluencers frequently have their own channels 
but appear regularly on their parents’ channels as well.141 Unless a sponsorship 
contract expresses how much of the payment goes to each family member, it 
could be difficult to discern how much of the earnings should be attributed to 
the child and whether the threshold amount was met to invoke a Coogan trust 
requirement. We can look to California, which exempts background 
performers from Coogan coverage,142 and states like Pennsylvania, which 
apply labor regulation to child reality show stars only when the program 
“expressly depends upon the minor’s participation” and the “participation is 
substantial.”143 Similarly here, if the contract does not specify how much 
money is directed to the child, the threshold calculation could be apportioned 
based on how much of the content “depends upon the minor’s participation” 
and in which the child’s participation is “substantial.”144 
Importantly, Coogan trusts have three major shortcomings, in both this 
context and for child actors more broadly. First, under the California model, 
when parents do not set up Coogan trusts, 15% of the gross earnings are 
deposited into a state fund instead of given to the family.145 Though the state 
is obligated to send notice of the retained funds once the child turns 
eighteen,146 there is a real possibility that the former-child-actor cannot be 
reached or redeem the funds, so the state could effectively profit off its child 
labor law. 
 
141 Every member of the Labrant family has their own Instagram page, including 7-year-old 
Everleigh Rose (5.1 million followers), 1-year-old Posie (1.7 million followers), and new-born Zealand 
(562,000 followers). Everleigh Rose Bryant (@everleighrose), INSTAGRAM, 
https://www.instagram.com/everleighrose/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/QS69-CVZU]; Posie Rayne 
LaBrant (@posierayne), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/posierayne/?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/28WD-UGL6]; Zealand LaBrant (@zealand.labrant), INSTAGRAM , https://www.
instagram.com/zealand.labrant/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/8P32-9UFU]. 
They also all appear on each family member’s page. The family has a joint YouTube channel (12.8 million 
followers), and Everleigh Rose also has her own (3.51 million subscribers). The LaBrant Fam, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4-CH0epzZpD_ARhxCx6LaQ/featured [https://perma.cc/ZN6G-
92CX]; Everleigh Rose, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCHo2Gib_Jx09ym3xDKjyGhg 
[https://perma.cc/CA38-FAAX]. 
142 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6752 (West 2020) (exempting a child who works as “an extra, 
background performer, or in a similar capacity” from Coogan Laws). 
143 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 40.5 (West 2020). 
144 Id. 
145 FAM. § 6752 (stating that if the parent or guardian does not supply the employer with 
Coogan account information within 180 days of the employment, “the employer shall forward to 
The Actors’ Fund of America 15 percent of the minor’s gross earnings”) 
146 Id. (requiring that the Fund make one attempt to contact the child once they turn eighteen 
by sending a notice to the child’s last known address). 
2020] When Play Becomes Work 603 
Second, approximately 8.4 million households were unbanked in America 
in 2017.147 The Coogan law structure requires these families to set up bank 
accounts, regardless of their preferences. This is especially harmful to 
undocumented immigrants and citizens without the forms of identification 
required to set up a bank account. 
Third, and most niche to the social media context, influencers are often 
paid with products rather than money, especially when they are starting out.148 
Coogan trusts cannot protect children who are paid in products or services. 
Nevertheless, kidfluencers with some of the largest followings who arguably 
suffer the most loss-of-privacy harm are paid huge amounts of cash,149 so the 
law would at least be protecting those children at the height of exploitation. 
Though the Coogan trust structure is not perfect, it can be readily applied 
to the social media context and serve as a first step in protecting this new 
generation of exploited talent. 
B. Work Permits 
Coogan trusts provide financial protection to child performers, but, as 
discussed above, many of the harms facing kidfluencers are not financial in 
nature.150 There have been calls for work-permit requirements for social 
media influencers to preempt some of those harms.151 But the issue is not as 
cut and dry as it might seem, and states should conduct research and debate 
before imposing a permit requirement. 
Currently, twenty-six states require child actors to obtain work permits 
for entertainment work.152 California, for example, requires children to renew 
the permit each year and verify school record, attendance, and health.153 New 
York’s child actor laws require a permit for New York residents, even if the 
work is conducted outside of the state, and for non-residents who conduct 
creative services within the state.154 This would of course be difficult to extend 
to social media kidfluencers because the content creation is mobile, meaning 
 
147 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC NAT’L SURV. OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2017). 
148 Maheshwari, supra note 12 (“For most nanoinfluencers, money isn’t part of the deal. Free 
products are viewed as fair compensation . . . .”). 
149 Maheshwari, supra note 11. 
150 Supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 23 (arguing in favor of extending child labor laws to social media 
stars); Lambert, supra note 23 (citing a lobbyist in California who is a proponent of requiring permits 
because parents “may be unprepared for a kidfluencer’s fame and unequipped to handle it”). 
152 Child Entertainment Laws as of January 1, 2020, U.S. DEP. OF LAB. (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor/entertainment [https://perma.cc/H4FB-L47M]. 
153 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11753(a) (2020). 
154 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12 § 186-2.1(b) (2020). 
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any influencer who posts about a trip to New York for profit or 
complementary services may be expected to file for a work permit. 
To be sure, there would be impactful benefits if work permits were 
required for kidfluencers. First, a permitting scheme like in California or New 
York would ensure that the social media work is not excessively interfering 
with the child’s education because it would require a school official to verify 
the child’s academic and attendance records.155 Second, because the permits 
would have to be renewed periodically, it would require active 
acknowledgement by the parents that their child is a worker. That is, parents 
would be reminded of the sacrifices their kids are making and that this activity 
is legally recognized as work, not just play. Third, parents who are registered 
with the state may be less likely to include their children in explicit or 
dangerous content out of fear of state monitoring. And fourth, states could 
collect data to inform future policy decisions in this growing industry. 
Nevertheless, requiring work permits akin to the child actor context may 
be impracticable in the kidfluencer industry. First, social media posting is 
mobile and global, and it is infeasible to require families to apply for permits 
in every state where the child films sponsored content. Second, and perhaps 
most problematic, the industry is much faster-paced than traditional 
entertainment. For a studio actor, the child’s guardian can apply for a permit 
with a fairly accurate idea of what the work will entail, the time frame, and 
the location. Social media deals can be made and completed within hours, so 
permitting would not be as accurate. Further, permits take time to get 
approved. When a video goes “viral,” the kidfluencer may need to capitalize 
on that opportunity immediately because the attention span of social media 
users is progressively shrinking.156 
Moreover, as with permits for child actors, states can charge fees and thus 
create a barrier to entry. These fees are not negligible—in California, for 
example, the initial application fee for a child-performer permit is $198 and 
the yearly renewal fee is currently $166.157 This means any child who gains a 
 
155 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1308.6 (West 2020) (empowering the Labor Commission to conduct 
necessary investigations to ensure permits are only granted to child performers if the work 
environment is proper, “not detrimental to the health of the minor,” and the minor’s education will 
not be “neglected or hampered” by the work); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 151 (McKinney 2020) (requiring the 
child performer to provide evidence of “satisfactory academic performance” for each semester of the 
employment as a condition of the work permit). 
156 See Phillipp Lorenz-Spreen, Bjarke Mørch Mønsted, Philipp Hövel & Sune Lehmann, 
Accelerating Dynamics of Collective Attention, NATURE COMMC’NS, Apr. 15, 2019, at 2, 
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-019-09311-w [https://perma.cc/GWL7-D8XM] (reporting 
that empirical evidence shows a global trend toward “shorter intervals of collective attention given 
to each cultural item” on social media). 
157 Child Performer Services Permit – Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CAL. DEPT. OF INDUS. RELS. 
(May 2019), https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Child_performer_services_permit_FAQs.htm#fe16 [https://
perma.cc/3X7N-8W65]. 
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large following but cannot afford the permit fee would not be allowed to accept 
sponsorships even though they are doing the same work as other children. 
Beyond a financial burden, some families may be deterred from entering the 
market because of their apprehension about registering with the state. 
Again, this work takes place in the home and is largely directed by the 
parents158—on balance, a state could reasonably decide that the doubtless 
benefits of a permit system do not outweigh the intrusion on the family unit 
or the unworkability of permitting in this fast-paced industry. 
C. Production Regulations 
Though there have been calls for states to impose Coogan trust and 
permit requirements for child social media influencers, there has not been 
mainstream attention to the other common child actor regulations, 
specifically concerning work hours, conditions, and on-set teachers. Like 
permits, these regulations would help protect the welfare of child workers, 
but they are both difficult to implement and arguably an excessive intrusion 
on the family unit. 
Surely regulating the hours, conditions, and education of child performers 
benefits them and helps protect them from the harms of exploitation. As 
described above, financial exploitation is not the only threat facing 
kidfluencers—there are also risks of pervasive privacy loss, psychological 
harm, and excessive hours because the work is constant and mobile.159 
Limiting the hours that parents and companies can work with kidfluencers 
would ensure that they have some private life outside of social media, and 
requiring certain workplace conditions that must be approved by an 
employer-hired teacher might protect kids in dangerous environments, like 
the Hobson children.160 
But these regulations could be difficult and even impossible to impose. 
Even if the state set an hour limit that these children can work, the only way 
to enforce that rule would be to monitor the families within their own homes, 
which would be an overstep by the state.161 A state might consider a self-
reporting enforcement process where, if there is a report of excessive working 
hours, the parents must log the hours the child works each week, including 
preparation and filming. Though this approach could alleviate some of the 
concerns regarding home intrusion by the state, self-reporting may not be 
 
158 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 110–17 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
161 “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1065) 
(making clear that states have restricted authority to search people’s homes for criminal enforcement). 
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effective and would still enable the state to granularly monitor the activities 
between parent and child at home. 
Similar issues would arise if a state were to impose child-actor education 
requirements on kidfluencers. California, for example, requires studios to 
provide on-set teachers to educate the child performers and also to represent 
the child’s interest in health and welfare.162 States cannot simply apply studio-
teacher requirements of this nature to the social media influencer context 
because that would require parents or corporate sponsors to hire teachers to 
be “on set” in the family’s home. The imposition is suitable for a studio-
setting, outside of a family’s home and with a significant budget for a longer-
term project. But states cannot expect parents to meet these standards inside 
their home, with a single-family budget, and with a less sophisticated 
knowledge of the law. Whether states can constitutionally impose home-
teaching requirements like this on parents is a live question,163 but parents do 
have the right generally to direct the education of their children.164 And in 
any event, the point stands that an on-set teacher requirement is unworkable 
in this industry. 
Until policymakers can construct more appropriate workplace regulations 
for social media production, child welfare laws could theoretically suffice as a 
backstop to child abuse and neglect. Regulations about content production, 
including education requirements and workplace safety mandates, duplicate 
many states’ current laws regarding truancy and child abuse.165 Of course 
protecting children from excessive hours and providing an additional agency 
overseeing these children’s safety is desirable, but until states decide the 
appropriate level of regulation, there are at least existing safety regulations. 
 
162 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
163 Indeed, the limits of the parental right to direct a child’s education have not been settled, 
especially in the homeschooling context. Because states, federal courts, and scholars disagree on how 
much the state may regulate parental education within the home, the question of on-set teachers for 
at-home influencers is also unclear. See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he right to be free from all reporting requirements and ‘discretionary’ state oversight 
of a child’s home-school education has never been recognized.”). See generally, Billy Gage Raley, Safe 
at Home: Establishing a Fundamental Right to Homeschooling, 2017 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 59-60 (2017) 
(collecting cases and articles to show that the question of whether homeschooling is constitutionally 
protected is not yet resolved). 
164 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–5 (1925) (continuing the reasoning of Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in recognizing “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control”). This right is not without limits, as indicated 
by debate over whether there is or should be a constitutional right to homeschool one’s children. 
165 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48264 (West 2020) (allowing school and state officers to 
arrest students found skipping school without an excuse, and imposing procedures for repeat truants, 
including community service and state programs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d (West 2020) 
(providing an example of state child abuse laws). 
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Fundamentally, even though this Comment argues that kidfluencers are 
workers who need protection and compensation, it is also true that social 
media is simultaneously a personal and private expression of self as well as a 
job. Financial protection is possible through Coogan trusts because they 
simply guarantee the child receives some compensation for their labor. But 
other regulations regarding workplace conditions intrude on the actual 
activities of the family unit. The balance between family autonomy and child-
actor protection is difficult in this context, so states and the federal 
government should continue to study this nuanced area before imposing 
regulations or simply adding kidfluencers to existing child actor laws. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of the “kidfluencer” has introduced a new form of labor that is 
unregulated in our state-based child acting law regime. Children spend hours 
per day producing high-valued content at the direction of their parents with 
no financial or personal protection besides the good will of their parents. 
Although states do not have the right to unduly intervene in a parent’s raising 
of their child, states should at least provide financial protection through the 
Coogan trust model outlined above.166 Other typical child acting regulations, 
like work permits and workplace condition requirements, would indeed 
protect the child but may be unworkable or overly invasive in the social media 
context where the work occurs at home with the parents. 
Underlying this entire discussion is the question of whether social media 
labor regulations could be more effective as federal law rather than state 
based. Indeed, in 2015, Congresswoman Grace Meng introduced a bill that 
would federally regulate the number of hours that child actors can work and 
impose a federal Coogan trust requirement.167 Federal regulation may be even 
more fitting for social media production, which is mobile and greatly affects 
interstate economy. Even if kidfluencing is not added under the standard 
FLSA regulations, these children may have an interest in federal protection 
that merits their own tailored regulations. 
But until federal law begins to accommodate social media production, any 
protection must be created at the state level. Social media marketing is new, 
growing, and distinct from any other industry, including child acting. Thus, 
states should not merely add the words “and social media influencers” to 
existing child acting laws. Instead, states should consider imposing Coogan 
trust requirements for immediate financial protection and continue to 
research and refine the appropriateness of other regulations. 
 
166 Supra notes 133–50 and accompanying text. 
167 Child Performers Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 3383, 114th Cong. (2015). 
